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ABSTRACT
It is desirable to speed up secure tunnel negotiations in constrained mediums where
numerous clients are "competing" to form secure connections to destination servers or
endpoints. In support of that objective, techniques are presented herein that minimize the
authentication data that is transferred within encrypted tunnel handshakes under
constrained conditions where the data can introduce unacceptable slowness or failures. The
techniques may apply to Internet of Things (IoT) constrained environments in which
bandwidth is sparse and multiple devices are competing for bandwidth. The techniques
may also be used on the Internet with post-quantum algorithms, which can introduce
unnecessary slowness due to their long keys and signatures. Other environments that may
benefit include, for example, a Wireless Smart Utility Network (Wi-Sun) network, an
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) technical standard 802.15.4
network, virtual private networks (VPNs) and Zero-Trust Access networks, Web
acceleration or proxy functions, etc.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
It is desirable to speed up secure tunnel negotiations in constrained mediums where
numerous clients are "competing" to form secure connections to destination servers or
endpoints.

In such cases, sometimes establishing a connection and completing a

transaction can take minutes or even hours depending upon the medium and the number of
endpoints.
One example is an IEEE mesh network that typically involves utilities and smart
cities verticals. As described in the IEEE technical standard 802.15.4, a mesh network
traditionally uses 900 megahertz (MHz) radio frequencies in a channel about 75 kilobits
per second (Kbps). As illustrated in Figure 1, below, mesh network traffic often aggregates
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to a mesh aggregation point like a connected grid router (CGR). Traditionally, these
networks can be lossy with a relatively high loss probability. When there is loss or a failed
transaction attempt, an endpoint backs off for some period of time to prevent further
lockups due to contention and then tries the transaction again. As there may be thousands
of endpoints and the aggregating link may be the bottleneck, it can sometimes take an
endpoint minutes or even hours to establish a successful connection.

Figure 1: Illustrative Mesh Network
Connections typically involve secure tunnels that offer data privacy and
authentication.

For example, sometimes these are Constrained Application Protocol

(CoAP) transactions running over a Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) or a
Transport Layer Security (TLS) – i.e., a (D)TLS – connection. Ideally, these connections
should succeed the first time in order to speed up the transactions in the whole network.
Another example is a Wi-SUN mesh network in which endpoints employ
Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) based mutual
authentication. Although a number of Wi-SUN mesh devices may be Full Function
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Devices (FFDs) – i.e., not power constrained – there are also Limited Function Devices
(LFDs) that are battery powered.

Battery powered devices often have extremely

challenging requirements. For example, such devices typically need to operate on two AA
batteries (offering, for example, a capacity of 2000 milliamp hour (mAh)) and be able to
last up to 20 years. That means they are extremely sensitive, with the total number of
packet transmissions being the most energy consuming operation that they perform over
their 20 year lifetime. Additionally, in a Wi-SUN environment each node performs
periodic re-authentication thus multiplying the impact of excessive data exchanges. Any
reduction in the number of packets that are transmitted or re-transmitted, or in packet sizes,
is extremely desirable for Wi-SUN LFDs. Although FFDs don’t have power constraints,
and as such can communicate frequently or longer, there are still benefits to applying
approaches described herein to FFDs, as otherwise they consume more of the precious airtime, making less of the air-time available to the “application.”
An expensive aspect of secure connections ((D)TLS or other) in terms of data is
typically authentication (based on, for example, a public key infrastructure (PKI)). For
example, a connection using elliptic-curve cryptography, which is the norm in constrained
environments, usually employs 32 byte (B) ephemeral keys (Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman),
32 byte hashes (e.g., Secure Hash Algorithm 2 (SHA-2)) or 16 byte authentication tags
(e.g., 128 bit Advanced Encryption Standard-Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM)). A
(Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA)) certificate chain of a secure tunnel could add up to 2
kilobytes (KB) in each direction, which could result in a significant amount of data trying
to pass over a 75Kbps pipe when considering a large number (maybe thousands) of
endpoints.

Figure 2, below, illustrates such an example secure channel handshake

exchange.
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Figure 2: Illustrative Exchanges
Additionally, in a constrained environment with small size packets sending 2KB of
data could consume five or six packets or more. The loss probability is 1 - (1-p)n, where n
is the number of packets and p is the loss probability per packet. Using a conservative
value of p=10% loss probability per packet in a constrained environment yields a 65% loss
probability when 2KB are sent over n=5 packets in each direction. That would exacerbate
the issue by causing, possibly among other things, slowdowns, retransmissions, and
network contention.
It is desirable to shrink the authentication data sent as much as possible in order to
alleviate the mesh network load, convey fewer packets with a better success probability,
and experience faster connections.
Additionally, consideration must be given to the post-quantum algorithms being
standardized in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Post-Quantum
Cryptography (PQC) Project (currently in Round 3). Some of those algorithms (mainly
lattices) offer decent performance but the amount of data is significant. Specifically, the
Dilithium signature algorithm finalist offers good performance but also has 3-4KB size
keys and signatures which when used in secure tunnels (e.g., (D)TLS) would significantly
increase the size of authentication data. For example, it could result in over 10KB of
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"authentication data" in each direction. The effect that such algorithms could have on
constrained mediums like IEEE technical standard 802.15.4 mesh networks would be
detrimental. But even a regular Internet connection would slow down significantly due to
the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) congestion control algorithm as was shown in an
NDSS 2020 Research paper (https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/071 ). Thus, shrinking the amount
of data transferred is even more critical in a post-quantum future.
To address these challenges, techniques are presented herein that support enhanced
exchanges that may be utilized to minimize authentication data transferred via the
exchanges. It is important to note that the presented techniques do not change the
authentication handshake itself, which would have implications on widely used protocols,
such as (D)TLS. Instead, since the largest chunk of the authentication data (i.e., a
certificate chain) is repetitive in a handshake, aspects of the techniques presented herein
suppress sending the intermediate certificate authorities (CAs) and root CA certificates in
the certificate chain as shown in Figure 3, below. This decreases the "authentication data"
to only one certificate and one handshake signature instead of two to four certificates
(depending on the certificate chain) and a handshake signature. Such a decrease can
amount to over a 50% drop in the total "authentication data" or several KB in absolute size.

Figure 3: Enhanced Exchanges
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Aspects of the techniques presented herein encompass a number of elements that
are of particular interest and note. Various of those elements will be described and
discussed below.
A first element of interest and note concerns the caching of the peer certificate chain.
In order to omit the cert chain and shrink the “authentication data” the peer certificate chain
needs to be cached. The caching algorithm is responsible for maintaining a cache of the
CAs in the peer certificate chain. Most IoT endpoints communicate with a limited number
of nodes or controllers, thus, the caching algorithm is not expected to update the cache too
frequently. Other use-cases like Web browsing would require more frequent cache updates.
A cache consists of multiple CA certificates linked to a specific destination that the
endpoint communicates with along with a timestamp. A portion of an exemplary cache is
presented in Table 1, below.

Destination

CAs linked list

Timestamp

Peer 1

ICA1‐1, ICA1‐2, RootCA1

Nov 17, 2020, 10:30am

Peer 2

ICA2‐1, ICA2‐2, RootCA2

Nov 16, 2020, 9:00am

...

...

...

Table 1: Aspects of Exemplary Cache
In accordance with techniques of this disclosure, the cache update algorithm would
update the cache when there is an unknown destination (i.e., a cache miss). If the cache
was full, then the algorithm would remove the oldest cache entry and add the new one. In
pseudocode form aspects of the algorithm may be expressed as:
if (destination entry exists in the cache) then
update the timestamp in the destination cache entry
continue to the handshake by notifying the peer to suppress the CAs (step 2 below)
else
initiate a traditional handshake (without notifying the peer to suppress the CAs)
after the handshake is complete, get the peer CA certificates from it
if (the cache is full) then
remove the oldest entry from the cache (to make room for the new entry)
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add the new CA certificates from the most recent handshake

It is important to note that more complicated cache update algorithms are possible
that could take into consideration, for example, the frequency of the handshakes or the size
of each peer's CA certificates.
A second element of interest and note regarding the techniques presented herein
concerns notifying the client or the server that they do not need to send their certificate
chain because it is already cached.
The client-to-server and the server-to-client certificate chain suppression
notification needs to comply with the existing protocol handshake in order to ensure ease
of deployment. This may be achieved through a number of different approaches. Various
of those approaches are described and discussed below.
Approach I. A covert channel in the (D)TLS handshake may be used which would
not violate the protocol or compromise its security. The ClientHello and ServerHello that
are used in the handshake to exchange keying material include a 32 byte (256 bit) opaque
value (i.e., a random nonce) which is used to protect from replay attacks. Such values may
be used to signal the certificate chain suppression. A client may tell a server that they do
not want its certificate chain in its ClientHello.random value and the server reflects same
in its ServerHello.random value. To accomplish this the client or server will overload a
few (e.g., four) bits out of the 256 bits in the value. The rest of the random value will not
change at all. The client or server uses a predetermined byte to point to the bits which will
show its preference. For example, assume that the predetermined byte is byte number 27.
If the random byte number 27 of the nonce is 0x19 (25 in base 10) then the client or server
will flip bits number 25 through 28 of its (ClientHello or ServerHello) random nonce to 0
if it wants the peer certificate chain suppressed, as shown in Figure 5, below.
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Figure 5: Illustrative Suppression Approach
Note, that this approach sacrifices four bits of randomness out of the 256 bits of the
random value and thus has no security implication.

TLS 1.3 sacrifices 64 bits of

randomness to prevent TLS downgrade attacks by hardcoding the last 8 bytes of the nonce.
Also note that this method has 1/2^4 or a 6.3% probability of false suppression which will
lead to a failed handshake and a new attempt. If such a probability (i.e., 6.3%) is inadequate
then the failure probability may be altered by changing the number of bits from four to, for
example, six or more. It is important to recognize that this approach is backwards
compatible with existing implementations. If an endpoint has not been upgraded to support
certificate suppression, then it will simply treat the nonce as a nonce and never omit the
certificate chain, resulting in everything working as before.
Approach II. A client or a server could also use the certificate_authorities extension
that is defined in RFC 6347 (for (D)TLS 1.2) and RFC 8446 (for (D)TLS 1.3) in its
ClientHello or Server CertificateRequest, respectively. As stated in the standards -- "The
client MAY send the certificate_authorities extension in the ClientHello message. The
server MAY send it in the CertificateRequest message." In reality, these extensions are
rarely used today on the Internet or in IEEE technical standard 802.15.4 networks or in WiSun environments. According to the standards -- "the certificate_authorities extension is
used to indicate the certificate authorities (CAs) which an endpoint supports and which
SHOULD be used by the receiving endpoint to guide certificate selection. [...] The body of
the certificate_authorities extension consists of a list of the distinguished names [X501] of

8
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/3916

6578
9

Kampanakis and Chandra: MECHANISM TO SPEED UP SECURE COMMUNICATION HANDSHAKES IN CONSTRAI

acceptable certificate authorities [..] These distinguished names specify a desired
distinguished name for a trust anchor or subordinate CA; thus, this message can be used to
describe known trust anchors as well as a desired authorization space."
Thus, the client or server could signal the cached CAs that it does not need a
certificate chain from its peer and the peer will suppress them in its response. It is important
to recognize that this approach is backwards compatible with existing implementations. If
an endpoint has not been upgraded to support this mechanism, then the standards are not
violated and the peer will never omit the certificate chain, resulting in everything working
as before.
Additionally, combining Approach I and Approach II (as described above) ensures
that there is no false certificate chain suppression. Using both mechanisms together can
also provide assurance to the peer that the client or server indeed has cached the
intermediate CA cert since their names are included in the certificate authorities extension.
Approach III. Alternatively, only when (D)TLS 1.3 is employed, a:


client may use the tls_flags extension that is defined in the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) Internet-Draft draft-ietf-tls-tlsflags (originally used in the
now expired IETF Internet-Dract draft-thomson-tls-sic). The flag value will be
in the range 64 through 79 (which are reserved for private use) or in the range
80 through 2039 (which are available for specific environments or national and
corporate extensions). The flag may be used to signal a client's preference for
certificate suppression. For example, the client could use the value 65 to signal
to the server that it does not need the certificate chain. It is important to
recognize that this method is backwards compatible with existing
implementations.

If an endpoint has not been upgraded to support this

mechanism, then the standards are not violated and the server will never omit
the certificate chain, resulting in everything working as before.


server may use the certificate_request_context in the CertificateRequest
extension that is defined in TLS 1.3 (see RFC 8446) and DTLS 1.3 (see the
IETF Internet-Dract draft-ietf-tls-dtls13).

According to the standards, the

certificate_request_context is "an opaque string which identifies the certificate
request and which will be echoed in the client's Certificate message. The
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certificate_request_context MUST be unique within the scope of this
connection (thus preventing replay of client CertificateVerify messages)." The
server could signal its preference to not receive the certificate chain from the
client by overloading the certificate_request_context and copying selected
bytes from its ServerHello.random nonce. The nonce is unique and the client
could deduce the server's intentions by just checking for it in the
certificate_request_context. It is important to recognize that this method is
backwards compatible with existing implementations. If an endpoint has not
been upgraded to support this mechanism, then the standards are not violated
and the client will never omit the certificate chain, resulting in everything
working as before.
Approach IV. A special configuration on the client and the server could ensure that
neither the client nor the server sends its certificate chain to the peer. Of course, this
configuration will ensure that the endpoints are pre-loaded with the certificate chains so
the authentication can take place. The CoAP Simple Management Protocol (CSMP) is a
protocol that may be used to appropriately configure the endpoints.
Of further interest and note in the techniques presented herein include, for example:


The approaches that were described above do not alter the handshake. Existing
(D)TLS extensions may be overloaded to signal CA suppression without
requiring a new ClientHello or a ServerHello.



Both a client and a server may ask a peer to suppress its CA certificates, not
just, for example, the client.



More ways of signaling the omission of extra data in the handshake are
proposed that go beyond just utilizing TLS nonces or the flags extension in the
ClientHello.

In summary, techniques presented herein minimize the authentication data that is
transferred within encrypted tunnel handshakes where the data can introduce unacceptable
slowness or failures in order to speed-up secure tunnel negotiations in constrained mediums
in which numerous clients are "competing" to form secure connections to destination
servers or endpoints. Aspects of the presented techniques encompass, among other things,
caching of a peer certificate chain and notifying (through various approaches that are
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backwards compatible with existing implementations) a client or a server that they do not
need to send an item because their peer already has that item cached.
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